#RUN VBS FILE FROM CMD PERU CODE#

This is because Mshta will execute HTA content in files with any extension (or none at all) as long as the file extension is not mapped to a text/plain MIME type (e.g., Mshta will not execute a file with a. The Agent Tesla, Azorult, Lockbit, Lokibot, and Ursnif malware families all used inline execution of VBScript or JScript, or file-based execution of HTA content in files that did not have the commonly associated. Therefore, itвЂ™s no surprise that in 2020 we observed an increase in adversary techniques to disguise Mshta execution and evade brittle detection logic. One threat we observed leveraging this technique in 2020 dropped Remcos via HTA content hidden behind a shortened URL:ДЄdversaries know that defenders are aware of MshtaвЂ™s potential for abuse. This technique is popular because the malicious payload is not directly visible in the command line, as it is with inline execution, and permits the execution of remotely hosted HTA content in a proxy-aware fashion. Adversaries can direct Mshta to execute HTA content stored in a local or remote file by passing a location on disk, a URI, or a Universal Naming Convention (UNC) path (i.e., a path prefixed with \ that points to a file share or hosted WebDAV server) to the file in the command line.

#RUN VBS FILE FROM CMD PERU CODE#

Key terms like these make for reliable detection logic and are a good indication that Mshta is being mischievous.Д¬onversely, some adversaries choose to execute code stored in a file. Notice the use of ActiveXObject and regread in both the Kovter example above and the Ursnif example below. Zscaler put out a great report detailing UrsnifвЂ™s technique shift from PowerShell to Mshta. Ursnif has used similar inline execution combined with code stored in the registry as part of its multistage initial access. HereвЂ™s an example of Kovter persistence in action: This behavior gained notoriety several years ago with Kovter malware, remnants of which we still observed in 2020 despite this threat vanishing from the landscape following the 2018 indictment and arrest of the operators. VBScript or JScript can be passed directly to Mshta via the command line for execution. Inline execution of code doesnвЂ™t require the adversary to write additional files to disk. The two most commonly abused Mshta technique variations we observed in 2020 were inline and file-based execution. by calling the RunHTMLApplication export function of mshtml.dll with rundll32.exe as an alternative to mshta.exe.COM-based execution for lateral movement.file-based execution via an HTML Application (HTA) file.inline via an argument passed in the command line to Mshta.There are four primary methods by which adversaries leverage Mshta to execute arbitrary VBScript and JScript:

Run vbs file from cmd peru